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COGNITION AND EMOTION, 1997, 11 (516), 569-583 
On the Contributions of Deficient Cognitive Control 
to Memory Impairments in Depression 
Paula T. Hertel 
Trinity University, San Antonio, USA 
Research on cognitive biases in depression suggests that deficient control of 
attention underlies impairments in memory for emotionally neutral events. 
Such impairments might result from general difficulties in focusing and 
sustaining attention, specific and habitual priorities to attend to matters of 
personal concern, or both. This paper considers these alternative means of 
impairment in the context of a review of selected theories and findings; a test 
of the framework is illustrated; and related considerations are discussed. 
INTRODUCTION 
The research domain of depression and memory has been defined by two 
almost independent lines of inquiry. The more active line has focused on 
findings of particularly good memory for emotionally negative events, 
whereas the other has pursued issues of impaired memory for emotionally 
neutral events. When the question about the relationship between these 
lines arises, it is generally assumed that the propensity for negative or self­
focused thinking in depression provides a rich context for elaborating 
mood-related material but intrudes during the processing of neutral mate­
rial to produce interference (e.g. Ellis & Ashbrook, 1988; Gotlib, Roberts, 
& Gilboa, 1996; Ingram, 1990). Compared to the bias assumption, how­
ever, the intrusion assumption is less well developed theoretically and 
more neglected empirically, in spite of the importance of understanding 
Requests for reprints should be sent to Paula Hertel, Department of Psychology. Trinity 
University, 715 Stadium Drive, San Antonio, TX 78212, USA; e-mail: phertel@trinity.edu. 
The author is grateful to Mary Blehar and Howard Kurtzman of the National Institute of 
Mental Health for organising the (September 1995) workshop on the cognitive psychology of 
depression, to the workshop participants who stimulated portions of this paper, and to three 
anonymous reviewers for their helpful comments. This work was partly supported by 
Discretionary Faculty Development Funds allocated by Mary Stefl and Edward Roy of 
Trinity University. 
© 1997 Psychology Press Ltd 
570 HERTEL 
memory impairment in depression. The point of this paper is to examine 
the means by which intrusive thoughts might impair memory for emotion­
ally neutral events. 
The effects of thought intrusions on memory for neutral events can 
occur, roughly, at two general stages and for two different reasons. First, 
such thoughts might redirect attention during the initial processing epi­
sode and thereby detract from processes that enhance deliberate retrieval 
later on. Second, even when the events are well attended initially, 
intrusions during the retention interval and at the time of the test might 
impair deliberate retrieval. These and other effects of thought intrusions, 
moreover, might occur primarily because a depressed person's self-con­
cerns are more compelling or attention-demanding than are those of a 
nondepressed person. In other words, the effect might be related speci­
fically to the attentional priorities and current concerns associated with 
depression (see Klinger, 1982). Alternatively or in addition, the effects 
might reflect a more pervasive problem. Reduced synaptic activity in the 
prefrontal cortex is associated both with difficulties in sustaining attention 
and self-initiation (e.g. Posner, 1992; Duncan, Emslie, & Williams, 1996) 
and with depressed states (e.g. Henriques & Davidson, 1991; Resnick, 
1992). Therefore, a reasonable hypothesis is that frontal hypoactivation in 
depression makes it difficult to sustain attention, regardless of one's 
motivation to focus on the task. Perhaps any off-task thoughts would 
engender more-memorial difficulties for depressed people than for others. 
Self-focused ruminations typify off-task thoughts in depression (Ingram, 
1990) and perhaps produce a higher frequency of intrusive thoughts, but 
the consequence might be more profound for depressed people than for 
others, due to fundamental difficulties in redirecting attention to the task 
at hand. 
BACKGROUND 
Depression-related Deficits in Memory 
for Neutral Events 
Burt, Zembar, and Niederehe's (1995) meta-analysis across 147 studies of 
recall and recognition in clinically depressed and nondepressed samples 
revealed clear evidence ·of depression-related deficits in remembering 
neutral material. Other, less formal reviews have concluded that the 
deficits can be predicted by reference to the continuum of controlled to 
automatic processing (e.g. Hartlage, Alloy, Vazquez, & Dykman, 1993; 
Williams, Watts, MacLeod, & Mathews, 1988). Cognitive processes are 
categorised broadly according to the degree or attention they require 
--- -- -·-- �- - - .. --
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(e.g. Hasher & Zacks, 1979). Those processes that require little or no 
attention or awareness are said to be automatic, and those that require 
more attention are called controlled processes. Controlled processes com­
pete with each other in a limited capacity system. That is, we cannot think 
about very many things at the same time. Controlled procedures, however, 
become more automatic through practice and thereby require less attention 
for their enactment. 
The continuum of controlled to automatic processes is relevant to 
memory at two primary stages: initial exposure to the material and later 
testing. At initial exposure, materials are processed with varying degrees of 
attentional control; merely reading words is relatively automatic, for · 
example, whereas making deliberate judgements about their meaning is 
more controlled. In general,-initial procedures that promote later recall, 
such as elaboration or distinction, tend to be more attention-demanding 
(e.g. Tyler, Hertel, McCallum, & Ellis, 1979). A number of published 
experiments have shown depression-related impairments in deliberate 
memory for neutral materials that had been presented in attention-demand­
ing tasks (for recent reviews see Gotlib et al., 1996; Hartlage et al., 1993). 
Such deficits occur typically in tests of free recall and are less frequently * 
found in recognition. In this regard, the continuum of controlled to auto­
matic processes is also relevant to retrieval conditions. 
Performance on memory tests is influenced both by controlled, delib­
erate reflection on the past episode and by automatic effects of prior 
exposure (e.g. target words pop into mind or feel familiar; see Jacoby, 
Toth, & Yonelinas, 1993). Controlled retrieval processes are thought to 
dominate tests of free recall, where deficits are most typically found. 
Recognition tests less frequently show deficits because they are good 
examples of the joint operation of automatic and controlled retrieval 
processes (i.e. a word feels familiar because it is fluently processed, the J 
source of familiarity is remembered, or both; see Jacoby, 1991). By 
using Jacoby's (1991) procedures for separating the controlled and 
automatic components of retrieval on recognition tests, Hertel and 
Milan (1994) showed that only the controlled component was disrupted 
in a sample of dysphoric students. Similarly, tests of implicit memory, . 
which are designed to side-step controlled reflection and to reflect 
primarily automatic influences of past experience, rarely reveal impair- * 
ments associated wj!lt depression_or.dyspl1oria (e.g. Danion et al., 1991; 
·Hertel-·&-Hari:.Hn�- f990; Watkins, Mathews, Williamson, & Fuller, 1992). 
In summary, attention-demanding cognitive procedures, performed dur­
ing initial exposure or testing, · lie at the heart of depression-related 
impairments in memory. Theoretical issues now pertain to the nature 
of their role. ' 
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The review by Hartlage et al. (1993) emphasised two theoretical 
perspectives· and referred to them as the capacity-reduction hypothesis 
and the attention-narrowing hypothesis. In brief, the capacity-reduction 
hypothesis, as exemplified by Weingartner and colleagues (e.g. Weingart­
ner, Cohen, Murphy, Martello, & Gerdt, 1981), claims that depression 
reduces the amount of processing capacity available for allocation to 
cognitive tasks, whereas the attention-narrowing hypothesis claims. that 
memory deficits occur because attention is focused on personal concerns, ' 
rather than on the task at hand. (The resource-allocation hypothesis-Ellis 
& Ashbrook, 1988-was described as a combination of these two hypoth­
eses.) At this point, the available evidence suggests that the capacity­
reduction hypothesis is inadequate. First, depressed people have sufficient 
capacity to perform well when experimental materials are self-relevant and 
congruent with their current mood (see Bower, 1992). Similarly, the social 
judgement literature contains evidence that, compared to others, dysphoric 
students engage more effortful procedures in situations that threaten their 
sense of social control (see Weary, Marsh, Gleicher, & Edwards, 1993, for 
review). Third, several studies have shown depression-related impairments 
under easier processing conditions with relatively lax external control (e.g. 
Hertel, 1994b, on implicit memory; Smith, Tracy, & Murray, 1993, on 
categorisation), but not under more difficult but better controlled conditions 
(e.g. Hertel & Rude, 1991a; Smith et al., 1993). More generally, capacity 
accounts of memory difficulties have been criticised on theoretical grounds 
(see Hasher & Zacks, 1988, who emphasise impaired inhibitory processes , 
instead). 
Although the capacity account is an insufficient account of memory 
impairments in depression, the notion that there are limits on how much 
can be attended to at any one time, regardless of mood or psychopathol­
ogy, is important. This notion, moreover, is essential to the attention­
narrowing account of depressive memory and to yet another account, 
briefly mentioned by Hartlage et al. (1993) as the motivation account. 
Motivation accounts __ of depression (such as the hopelessness theorY of 
Abramson, Metalsky, & Alloy, 1989; also see Kuhl & Helle, 1986) do 
not address cognitive control in the present sense, but by emphasising 
perceived lack of control in general, they suggest that depressed people 
often do not voluntarily initiate controlled procedures. It is this impair­
ment in cognitive control that serves as the central feature of the 
cognitive initiative account of depressive deficits in memory (Hertel & 
Hardin, 1990). 
Cited by Hartlage et al. (1993) as exemplifying motivation accounts, the 
cognitive initiative framework is perhaps better viewed as a blend of 
attention and motivation accounts. It claims that depression-related impair­
ments in remembering occur when attention during the initial task or 
� -- --�-----�----�-=---..:..,-
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during the test is not well controlled by external means. Under these lax or 
unconstrained conditions, depressed people are less likely than others to 
employ controlled, attention-demanding procedures on their own initiative. 
Depression-related deficits in recall of word lists, for example, occur under 
conditions of medium structure, where the initiative to organise can pay , 
off, rather than on completely unstructured lists, where it does not (Chan-
�, non, Baker, & Robertson, 1993; Watts, Dalgleish, Bourke, & Healy, 1990). 
Other support for the initiative framework has come from experiments 
showing �that depression-related impairments can be eliminated when 
depressed participants are instructed to do what others seem to do on their 
own initiative-in other words, when attention is under better environmen­
tal control (see Hertel, 1994a). 
Consider an experiment in which participants were either required or not 
required to sustain attention to words in sentence contexts during an 
incidental learning task (Hertel & Rude, 1991 a). Compared to the non­
depressed participants, the depressed participants who were not required to 
sustain attention showed impaired subsequent recall of words from more 
difficult or distinctive trials, whereas those who were required to sustain 
attention showed no impairment in remembering words from those trials. 
Based on such evidence, we have argued that the deficiencies are under­
stood better in terms of impaired attentional control than in terms of 
resource limitations; depressed participants clearly were capable of allo­
cating sufficient resources on the more effortful processing trials. We had 
also speculated that unconstrained conditions produce deficits because they 
offer windows of opportunity for attending to matters other than the task at 
hand. The main difficulty with the initiative account is that, although 
studies have shown that depressed people are capable of attending in 
beneficial ways when appropriately guided, we do not yet understand 
why they fail to do so voluntarily. Does the failure reflect a general 
impairment in cognitive control (regardless of motivation), or a more 
specific set of priorities for attention that are motivated by personal 
concerns? 
Priorities for Attention, Automatic Thoughts, and 
Rumination 
Evidence for mood-congruent recall suggests that depressed people are 
indeed motivated to attend to matters related to their concerns and to 
initiate processes that help them to remember (e.g. Bradley & Mathews, 
1983). In this case, off-task thoughts that are mood-related presumably 
provide routes useful in controlled retrieval. To explain such evidence of 
mood-congruent recall, investigators often refer to Bower's (1981) net­
work model, in which emotion nodes are linked to concept nodes when 
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concurrently activated. The model has been adopted by cognitively 
oriented depression theorists (e.g. Ingram, 1984) to describe how nega­
tive self views influence performance on cognitive tasks and adapted to 
incorporate features of Beck's schema theory of depression (Beck, Rush, 
Shaw, & Emery, 1979), with its emphasis on negatively toned, automatic 
thoughts. Although the model has organised and inspired a great deal of 
research on mood and memory, the ·default assumption-that moods J 
automatically activate associated information-has been challenged (see 
Mathews & MacLeod, 1994; Williams et al., 1988). The challenges 
include several failures to show depression-congruent effects on implicit 
tests of memory (e.g. Watkins et al., 1992) and mixed evidence for 
emotional Stroop effects in depression (see Gotlib et al., 1996; 
Mathews & MacLeod, 1994). In general, a simple version of the network 
model cannot easily accommodate evidence that controlled elaborative 
processes are biased in depression (but not in anxiety disorders) and that 
automatic pre-attentive processes are biased in anxiety disorders (but not 
so clearly in depression, except when highly correlated symptoms of 
anxiety may mediate). Still, the depression researcher is left with the 
problem of explaining the clinical phenomenon of automatic thoughts that 
earlier seemed to be well described by network theory. Perhaps the issues 
related to automaticity have been oversimplified and we should therefore 
reconsider the nature of automatic thoughts and rumination in depression 
(see Haaga, Dyck, & Ernst, 1991). 
The occurrence of automatic thoughts has been simulated in a series of 
experiments on thought suppression in which dysphoric participants are 
less successful than others in suppressing thoughts of neutral or depressive 
content (e.g. Conway, Howell, & Giannopoulus, 1991; Wenzlaff, Wegner, 
& Roper, 1988). Note that the thought-suppression paradigm captures an 
important aspect of automaticity: The process occurs even when one is 
trying to do the opposite (see Jacoby, 1991; Wegner, 1994). Furthermore, 
although such thoughts might spring to mind automatically, they provide 
cues for more sustained ruminations that characterise depressive episodes 
(Ingram, 1990). Th'erefore, there is good reason to retain Beck's notions of 
both automatic thoughts and ruminations in current cognitive formulations 
of depression. However, to say that negative thoughts come to mind 
automatically is not to demand evidence of negative biases in well-con­
strained tests like the emotional Stroop task or stem-completion tests of 
o implicit memory. Such 'thoiights--mc)re-likely arise in unconstrained situa­
tions that allow mind-wandering. Intrusive thoughts arise automatically 
because they have been practised well under similarly unconstrained 
conditions. Their initiation is automatically cued by unfilled intervals, 
but further ruminations spurred by these thoughts clearly occupy atten­
tion. In this way, automatic thoughts during unconstrained conditions can 
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invite rumination and provide sources of interference in ongoing tasks that 
require attention. 
' 
Rumination and Memory 
Are depressive ruminations associated with memory difficulties? Seibert 
and Ellis ( 1991) experimentally induced dysphoric states in college stu­
dents and found that recall was negatively correlated with the number of 
irrelevant thoughts voiced aloud during exposure to task materials or 
reported later. A similar relationship had earlier been found in clinically 
depressed people who were instructed to report losses of concentration 
(Watts & Sharrock, 1985). However, in the first case the induction proce-. 
dure itself included instructions to free associate to any thoughts that came . 
to mind as the participants attempted to place themselves in negative mood . 
states, and in the second case participants were alerted to concentration 
difficulties by the procedures. Therefore, these findings are difficult to 
generalise to uninstructed situations, but they do strongly suggest that if 
ruminations occur in the absence of instruction to focus on them, they 
would likely impair controlled retrieval of task materials. 
Summary 
The phenomena of automatic thoughts and subsequent rumination play 
potentially important roles in blending the two lines of research on depres­
sion and memory. Negative thoughts act as uninvited visitors during 
conditions of lax attention (see Bower, 1992). Due to practice, they 
know the way in. Now, we should concentrate on the consequences of 
the visit for ongoing and upcoming procedures. Are such thoughts detri­
mental because they are particularly interesting visitors or because 
depressed people have trouble showing anyone the door? This metaphor 
illustrates a central question yet to be addressed empirically by those of us 
who wish to understand the relationship between thought intrusions and 
impaired memory for neutral events: Is personal relevance necessary or 
-J merely sufficient to disrupt memory for neutral events? A set of experi­
ments in progress is aimed to address this question. Next, I offer some 
aspects of their design as an illustration of ways in which the present 
framework can guide investigations. 
EXAMPLE OF AN EXPERIMENTAL TEST 
Depression-related difficulties in controlling attention and avoiding intru­
sive thoughts are likely to occur during attempts to remember. Do these 
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difficulties derive primarily from the particularly compelling nature of 
depressive concerns, or might they also reflect more pervasive deficits? 
To address this question, an experiment nearing completion consists of 
three phases, the first and last being initial exposure and the memory test. 
Phase 2 contains the variation that is critical to the issues at hand and so it 
is described first. 
The unconstrained or "free" condition of Phase 2 is designed to mimic 
ideal conditions for rumination; subjects sit quietly and do nothing. Any 
current concerns could easily come to mind and occupy attention, but in 
the absence of such concerns or worries, the participants might take a 
break (or a nap!), or think about the previous task and rehearse for the 
upcoming test, about which they are forewarned. Depressed participants 
are more likely to ruminate (see Fennell & Teasdale, 1984). They should 
also remember fewer words on the subsequent test, because the act of 
ruminating should introduce general interference during the test phase. 
The point of the design, however, is to link these two phenomena­
rumination and poor memory-and for this purpose two additional 
conditions are included. 
These conditions, derived from procedures used by Nolen-Hoeksema 
and colleagues, instruct separate groups of both depressed and nonde­
pressed participants to think either about their current feelings and perso­
nal characteristics (in the self-focused task) or about geographical locations 
and objects (in the neutral task). In a number of experiments, the self­
focused task has increased ratings of negative moods made by depressed or 
dysphoric participants only, whereas the neutral task has decreased them 
(e.g. Lyubomirsky & Nolen-Hoeksema, 1995; Nolen-Hoeksema & Mor­
row, 1993). The point of the manipulation for the purpose at hand, how­
ever, is to determine if the self-focused task also impairs controlled 
components of retrieval, to a greater degree in a depressed sample than 
in a nondepressed sample, by establishing a ruminative cycle. The point is 
also to determine if the neutral task affects controlled retrieval in both 
samples, due to its. distracting nature, or whether the depressed sample 
might still suffer a relative impairment, due to general difficulties in 
switching attention to the task at hand. The outcomes from each of these 
tasks should inform us about the processes that occur freely in the uncon­
strained condition. 
Phases I and 3 are modelled closely on an experiment by Jacoby (1996). 
For the present purposes, one important feature of the method is the quick 
presentation of Phase-1 materials under instructions merely to read aloud. 
Little "room" is allowed for mind-wandering or rumination during this 
phase. Another important feature is the use of process-dissociation proce­
dures for separating controlled and automatic components of memory. 
Estimates of these components-from performance on inclusion and ex-
- - _. ��----�------"'"-"'-----:...< 
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elusion tests of fragment completion 1-serve as the dependent variables in 
separate analyses of the effects of the Phase-2 manipulation. The procedure 
itself is called "process dissociation" because a number of independent or 
grouping variables have been shown to affect estimates of one component 
while leaving the other component invariant. For example, only the con­
trolled component of retrieval is reduced by experimentally dividing 
attention during the study phase or the test phase (Jacoby et al., 1993) J 
and by using an older sample of participants (Jennings & Jacoby, 1993). 
More to the present point, dysphoric college students have shown deficits 
in the controlled (but not the automatic) component of recognition memory • 
(Hertel & Milan, 1994). 
The process dissociation procedure is an important feature of the design, 
due to its greater sensitivity when compared to explicit tests of memory, 
such as cued recall or recognition. For example, Hertel and Milan's (1994) 
experiment did not show evidence of an overall recognition deficit. More­
over, only the controlled, attention-demanding aspect of remembering 
should be affected by distractions, regardless of whether the deficiency is 
caused by attentional priorities or is more pervasive. Automatic uses of the 
past come into play regardless of one's cognitive control (as is evident in 
automatic thoughts more generally). 
The separation of controlled and automatic retrieval processes first 
permits a test of whether automatic uses of the past (A) remain unaffected 
by depression or distraction. Showing no depression-related differences in 
estimates of A would corroborate our findings in the recognition paradigm 
(Hertel & Milan, 1994). Showing no effect of distraction on the automatic 
component would parallel evidence from research on directed forgetting 
(e.g. Russo & Andrade, 1995). The advantage is to show such null findings 
10n each inclusion test trial, participants are instructed to complete the fragment in a 
word/fragment pair (e.g. building s_o_e) with a word from Phase l that is associatively 
related to the first word of the_ pair (e.g. stone). If they cannot recollect such a word, they 
should complete with the first word that comes to mind that fits the fragment and is related. 
The probability of completing with a Phase- I word on inclusion trials is assumed to be equal 
to the probability that the word is consciously recollected (C) or, in the absence of recollec­
tion, the probability that it comes to mind automatically (A): Inclusion= C + ( l  - C) A. On 
exclusion trials, participants are instructed to avoid using a word from Phase I to complete 
the fragment. They are encouraged to remember such a word but to use a different word that 
is also associatively related to the first word in the pair (e.g. store instead of stone). The 
probability of erroneously completing the fragment with a Phase-I word on exclusion trials 
is assumed to be equal to the probability that the word comes to mind automatically in the 
absence of conscious recollection: Exclusion = (I - C) A. An estimate of C is obtained for 
each participant by subtracting the proportion of Phase- I words used on exclusion trials from 
the proportion used on inclusion trials; then an estimate of A is calculated by substitution in 
one of the equations. See Jacoby (1996) for a fuller explanation. 
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on the same task that reveals differences in controlled retrieval associated 
with depression and the experimental manipulations. 
The predictions of greater interest pertain to estimates of controlled 
retrieval (C). To the extent that nondepressed participants entertain few 
task-irrelevant thoughts in the unconstrained condition, their performance 
should be best in that condition2; otherwise we would not expect differ­
ences across the three Phase-2 conditions for nondepressed participants. 
How should depressed participants perform? The unconstrained condi­
tion is the point of reference; that condition should produce lower estimates 
of C, relative to the nondepressed participants. Even though all participants 
are forewarned about the memory test, the unconstrained interval, never­
theless, should invite mind-wandering in the depressed sample. Second, 
estimates should be as low or lower in the self-focused condition, because 
any tendency toward off-task thoughts would be exacerbated by the self­
focused task. The interesting condition is the_ neutral one. Similar to the 
distracting condition in Nolen-Hoeksema and colleagues' research, it 
contains materials that improve mood-ratings in depressed samples. Will 
estimates of controlled retrieval similarly benefit by distraction from 
potentially intrusive thoughts, or will more general difficulties in redirect­
ing attention to the Phase-1 words keep performance depressed? Prelimin­
ary evidence gathered from dysphoric and non-dysphoric college students 
supports the priorities account; estimates of controlled retrieval produced 
by dysphoric participants in the neutral condition are reliably higher than in 
the other Phase-2 conditions, and comparable to those produced by nondy­
sphoric participants in the neutral condition? Evidence for general diffi­
culties in cognitive control, however, may very well depend on issues yet 
to be considered. 
OTHER CONSIDERATIONS 
The extent to which either source of difficulty in control characterises per­
formance by depressed people should vary with the severity of the depres­
sive episode. Severity exaggerates deficits in standard recall tasks (Johnson 
& Magaro, 1987) in which performance clearly depends on controlled 
procedures for both initial processing and retrieval. Furthermore, there is 
some evidence that severity is associated with mind-wandering (e.g. Watts 
& Sharrock, 1985), but whether increased mind-wandering is caused by 
2 This prediction relies on the classic finding by Jenkins and Dallenbach (1924) of retro­
active interference when participants were occupied with task irrelevant matters. 
3 If the pattern of means would show improvement in the neutral depressed group relative 
to the unconstrained depressed group but not to the level of the neutral nondcpressed group, 
it would suggest joint effects of general and specific (prioritised) difficulties. 
) 
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attentional priorities, frontal dysfunction, or both is yet to be determined. A 
safe bet is that frontal hypoactivation would be evidenced more clearly in 
severely depressed people (see Henriques & Davidson, 1991) and would be 
atypical in a sample of dysphoric college students. 
Even less is known about the relationship between the duration of 
depressive episodes and memory performance. The present framework 
suggests that practice in entertaining negative thoughts, perhaps as a 
function of duration of the episode, should increase the extent to which 
they occur automatically in unfilled intervals. Duration of the present 
episode, however, might not be as important a consideration as past 
history of depression. In this regard, Miranda, Persons, and Byers (1990) 
found that variations in reports of dysfunctional beliefs were direct func­
tions of negative mood states in asymptomatic individuals who had pre­
viously been depressed. Although reports of dysfunctional beliefs do not 
directly index how automatically such thoughts spring to mind, the finding 
helps raise the question of whether prior practice in negative thinking 
contributes to impaired control in negative mood states. 
These considerations of severity and duration might invite the reader to 
wonder whether mood induction techniques, shown to cause impaired 
memory following unconstrained tasks (e.g. Ellis, Thomas, & Rodriguez, 
1984; Hertel & Rude, 1991 b), do so by establishing task-irrelevant priorities _ 
for attention. Induction techniques are used for the purpose of making causal 
statements about depressed mood and memory, so researchers are motivated 
to assume that inductions provide adequate models of depression for the 
purpose of studying memory. Induction techniques sometimes, however, 
produce different patterns of results from those obtained with depressed orv 
dysphoric samples. In an experiment similar to one reported by Ellis et al. 
( 1984 ), for example, Hertel and Rude (1991 b) found different patterns of 
recall deficits, depending on whether negative mood states were induced or 
measured. Moreover, similar patterns of impairment (from inductions vs. 
natural mood states) can, on logical grounds, have different causes. For 
example, although some induction procedures used to establish memory 
deficits instruct subjects�to ruminate and encourage them to feel lethargic, 
they probably do not mimic general impairments in cognitive control. 
On the other hand, induction procedures can open the door to previously 
well-practised thoughts, as seen in the recent use of mood inductions to 
inform issues related to cognitive vulnerability for relapse in remitted 
samples (see Gotlib et al., 1996; Segal & Ingram, in press). Along the 
same lines, if remitted groups were asked to participate in the experiment 
on self-focused versus neutral distraction just described, we could investi­
gate differential effects of that manipulation on controlled retrieval (in 
comparison to never-depressed control groups). In other words, induction 
techniques can serve us better if we focus on the processes by which they 
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should affect performance than if we merely assume that their effects 
mimic processes associated with depression more generally. 
Finally, it is also important to consider whether this proposed account of 
depressive memory impairment extends to other affective disorders and to 
thought disorders. Impairments on memory tasks requiring controlled 
procedures are common in schizophrenia, for example, but not in anxiety 
disorders (see Burt et al., 1995; Williams et al., 1988). Moreover, anxiety­
disordered samples show some skill in directing attention away from 
sources of threat (see Mathews & MacLeod, 1994) and increased attention 
to the task at hand (although reduced efficiency; Eysenck & Calvo, 1992), 
whereas such control seems fundamentally impaired in schizophrenia. 
Clearly, these possible differences deserve further investigation as we 
attempt to distinguish among diagnoses of psychopathology in cognitive 
terms (see Ingram, 1984). 
IMPLICATIONS FOR INTERVENTION 
Investigations of impaired cognitive control in depression also suggest 
guidelines for intervention. Several lines of research converge in this 
direction. Teasdale et al. (1995a) have shown evidence of disruptions in 
depressive ruminations caused by well-constrained cognitive tasks, and 
thinking about neutral events improves the mood of depressed participants 
(Fennell, Teasdale, Jones, & Damle, 1987; Nolen-Hoeksema & Morrow, 
1993). What seems to be missing is an examination of possible therapeutic 
advantages in understanding associated effects on memory for neutral 
events and in seeking to overcome deficient performance in neutral tasks 
(see Williams, 1992). In everyday cognitive activities requiring controlled 
use of memory for neutral events, depressed people complain about poor 
performance. Success on these nonemotional tasks therefore should improve 
mood by short-circuiting cycles of hopelessness (Abramson et al., 1989). 
And in the context of cognitive-behavioural therapy, recollection of neutral 
" events is crucial in order to establish new interpretations (Teasdale, Segal, & 
Williams, 1995b ). In this regard, the type of control difficulty experienced 
by depressed people carries important implications. If the control of atten­
tion is generally impaired, improved performance during depressive epi­
sodes should depend on the degree of external control built into the 
intervention, but otherwise meaningful levels of improvement might await 
recovery. On the other hand, if the difficulties are at least partially respon­
sive to priorities established by prior practice, interventions should motivate 
and train thought control (while avoiding the pitfalls of simple thought 
suppression; see Wegner, 1994). Practice in redirecting attention offers 
hope by establishing new habits for reacting to intrusive thoughts in the 
typically unconstrained tasks of everyday life (Teasdale et al., 1995b ). 
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